## United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



**APPENDIX** 

## ORIGINAL

# 74.1042



## **United States Court of Appeals**

For the Second Circuit.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,


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LAM MAN CHUNG,

Appellant.

On Appeal From A Judgment Of The United States District Court For The Southern District of New York

APPENDIX FOR APPELLANT LAM



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Of Counsel ALAN SCRIBNER IVAN S. FISHER PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

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C. Form No. 169 GRIMINAL DOCKET

JUDGE LASKER 73 CHIL. 520

	TITLE OF	CASE			ATTORMEYS	7 111 - 27 - 22 - 27 - 27 - 27 - 27 - 27			
THE UNITED STATES				For U. S.:	For U. S.:				
vs.				Eugene F. Bannigan, AUSA					
WING PIU LAI -1,2,3& 6				264-	264-6345				
YUET LAN L	AI - 1, 2	3 & 6							
JUAN PANG-	CHEA -1,2	& 4							
LAM MAN CH	UNG, a/k/	a Ja B L	am -1 & 5						
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conspiracy so to do.(ct	.1)			<del></del>		1			
( Six Counts)	<u>_ll</u>		<u> </u>						
DATE			PROCEEDINGS			8			
2-28-73 Filed indistmen	t. (73Cr6	94.73Cr70	3,720±828	related (Las	korT.				
3-2-73 Filed Govt's am		•	-						
1.0-5-73 LAN MAN CHUNG - P	lled affdvi	t. for W/H/	C Ad Pros. W	rit issued, Ret	: 10-8-73.				
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10-26-73 LAM HAN CHUNG - F	ilad reque	st to charg	<u> </u>						
Supression heari	ng begun.			•					
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Supression heari	ng contid.			<u></u>		<u> </u>			
10-73 Jury Trial begun	before LA	sker,j.							
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Page 2

LASEKR J.

DATE	PROCEEDINGS			CLERK'S FFES			
	.,	PLAIN	TIFF	DEFEN	DEFENDANT		
10-11-73	Trial Cont'd. YUET LAN LAI severed on motion.						
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10-12-73	Trial cont'd.						
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10-15-73	Trial cont'd.						
<u>10-16-73</u>	Trial cont'd.						
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LO-17-73	Trial cont'd & adjd until 11-5-73.						
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11-5-73	Trial cont'd.						
i		1					
1-6-73	Trial cont'd.	ļ					
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1-7-73	Trial cont'd. Ct. 1 dismissed as to deft, LAM MAN CHUNG on motion.						
	and the state of t	-		<del></del>			
1-8-73	Trial cont'd and concluded, Jury verdict;						
	Deft. WING PIU LAI - GUILTY cts. 1.2.3 & 6.						
	JUAN PANG CHEA - GUILTY cts. 1,2 & 4.	<b></b>	i				
•	" LAM MAN CHUNG - GUILTY ct. 5.						
	Deft's in custody - Sentence date set for 12-21-73. LASKER, J.						
	Seasone date det 101 12-21-/5. LASAER, J.						
2-7-73	LAM MAN CHEUNG-Filed deft's affdyt & notice of motion for an order						
	treatile Alexandria						
	Vacating the conviction.	<del> : -</del>					
2-7-73	LAM MAN CHEUNG-Filed deft's memorandum of law.			·			
	Zar rank ourposto i lieu dell' s'inemplandum of 184.						
2-10-73	VIDT TAN YAT WATER TO SEE THE SECOND	<u> </u>			<del></del>		
	The state of lath. Whitehall						
14-20-7.	WILLIAM LAM- Filed notice of appeal from judgment of December 21	m/n					
-21-73	TITLE WILL TAR TO C. Alexandra						
-21-13	WING PIU LAI - Deft. (Atty Present) Filed J/C. Judgment #7/4-(2/						
<del></del>	" It Is Adjudged that the deft. is hereby committed to the	·					
	custody of the Atty. Gen. or his authorized representative						
	for imprisonment for a period of TEN (10) YEARS on each				·		
	of cts. 1,2,3 & 6 respectively, the sentence to run						
	concurrently and not consecutively and shall total fine						
	of \$40,000. to be paid within ninety days hereof. The			•			
GSA DC 72	deft. shall serve a special parole (cont'd on page 3)				- <del>-</del>		

DATE	PROCEEDINGS
	(cont'd from page 2) term of THREE (3) YEARS subject to the provisions of Title
	21, Section 841(b)(1)(A) and 42G8 a (2). LASKER, J. (copies issued)
12-21-73	JUAN PANG CHEA - Deft. (Atty.Present) Filed J/C P
	It Is Adjudged that the deft. is hereby committed to the custody of the
	Atty. Gen. or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period
	of Seven (1) YEARS on each of cts. 1.2 & 4 respectively, the sentence to
	run concurrently and not consecutively, and shall be fined the sum of
	1 33.333.33 on each cts. for a total fine of \$9.999.99 to be paid within
<del></del>	ninety days hereof. The deft. is to stand committed for non-navment and
	upon the completion of the term of custody, the deft, shall serve a
	special perole term of THREE (3) YEARS subject to the provisions of
	Title 21, Section 841(b)(1)(A), LASKER, J. (copies issued)
12-10-73	Non-Jury Trial begun before LASKER, J. Adj. until 12-20-73.
12-20-73	Trial Contd. and concluded.
	Tital concu. and concluded.
12-21-73	Court verdict - Deft.YUET LAN LAI acquittal, LASKER, J.
	Descrives and acquittal, LASACK, J.
1-4-74	IAM MAN CHUNG - Filed W/H/C/ Ad Pros. Writ satisfied 12-21-73. IASKER, J.
12-21-73*	The state of the s
	It Is Adjudged that the deft. is hereby committed to the custody of the
	Atty. Gen. or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a paried
	or Five (5) VAAS, said term of custody to commence upon the expiration of
	the term of custody presently being served for conviction under indictment
<del></del>	/3 Cr. 443, and dert is fined the sum of \$5,000, to be paid within score
•	(90) cays hereof, the deft. to stand committed for non-payment, ad upon the expiration of the term of custody imposed herein, the deft. shall
	serve a special parole term of six years subject to the provisions of Titl
<del> </del>	21, Section 841 (b) (1) (A). This sentence is subject to the provisions of
	16 U.S.C. 4208 (a)(2) permitting the deft. to become eligible for psrole
	at such time as the board of parole may determine. LASKER, J. (copies issue
1-3-74	Filed MEMO END on Deft.LAM MAN CHEUNG motion filed Dec. 7-73. Motion denied for the
	reasons stated on the record in open court when a similar motion by Lan Man
	Cheung's Atty. was denied. & on the authority of Ottamano -y- 11.S. 468 F(2)
	269 (1st Cir 1972) Cert. Den. 409 US 1128(1973) and the cases cited in the
	brief of the U.S. in opposition to this motion.
	It Is So Ordered, LASKER, J. ( n/m)
-8-74	Filed Govt, nemo of law,
16,74	Filed Trancript of proceedings dated Oct 8,9,10, 1973
n 16,74	Filed Transcript of proceedings dated # Oct 10, 11, 19763
16, 74	Filed Transcalpt of proceedings dated Oct 15,16, 17 & Nov 5,6,7, 1973
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

INDICTION

Wing Piu Lai, Yuet Lan Lai, Juan Pang Chea and Lam Man Chung, 2/k/a Ja B Lam, : S 73 Cr.

Defendants.

The Grand Jury Charges:

1. From on or about the 1st day of July, 1972 and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Southern District of New York, WING PIU LAI, YUET LAN LAI, JUAN PANG CHEA and LAM MANY CHENC 2/12/2 IA P Inc.

the defendants and others to the Grand Jury unknown, unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21, United States Code.

2. It was part of said conspiracy that the said defendants unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly would distribute and possess with intent to distribute Schedule I and II narcotic drug controlled substances the exact amount thereof being to the Grand Jury unknown in violation of Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21, United States Code.

USA-33s-527A - IND Rev. 5-27-72

IPN:41 73-2284

### SECOND COUNT

#### The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 20th day of Ame, 1973, in the Southern District of New York,

WING FIU LAI, WHET LAN LAI and JUAN PANG CHMA.

the defendant, unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule reactic drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately one pound of herein hydrochloride.

'Title 21, United States Code, Sections 612, '41(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

#### OVERT ACTS .

In pursuance of the said conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts were committed in the Southern District of New York:

- 1. On or about July 11, 1973, WING PIU LAI and YUET LAN LAI entered the National Link of North America, 44 Wall Street, New York, New York.
- 2. On or about July 11, 1973, WING PIU LAI mot JUAN PANG CHEA in the vicinity of 177 Christia Street, New York, New York.
- 3. On or about July 11, 1973, UNIG PIU LAI .
  YURT LAN LAI and JUAN PANG CHEA entered 261 Brooms Street.
  New York, New York.
- 4. On or about July 11, 1973, LAN MAN CHING, a/k/a JA B Lan entered 261 Broom Street, New York, New York,
- 5. On or about July 11, 1973, Lin Min Ching, a/k/a JA B Lam entered 261 Broom Street, New York, New York.

USA-33s-527A - IND/INF - Distrib. Possess Narc. Drug (Succeeding Count) Rev. 5-27-72

EFD: a1 73-2264

## COUNT

The Crand Jury further charges:

On or about the lith day of July, 1973 in the Southern District of New York,

vang piu lai did yvet lan lai,

the defendant , unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately two pounds of heroin hydrochlorids.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

USA-33s-527A - IND/INF - Distrib. Possess Narc. Drug (Succeeding Count)
Rev. 5-27-72

entreat 70-0200

#### TOTAL COUNT

Min Court Jury faction classes

On or about the 12th day of 125, 1975, in the Southern District of New York,

MING PAGE CIEA,

the defendant , unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit, appreciately too possess thereis investigation.

\*(iiiie XI; Hmited States Code, Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

USA-33s-528A - IND/INF - Possession With Intent to Dist. Narc. Drug Rev. 5-27-72 (Succeeding Count)

ETT: OF

### COUNT

Ha dand day further charges

On or about the the day of the Southern District of New York,

LOVING CRESS, MANAGE TANK

the defendant, unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did possess with intent to distribute, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately the press of larger larger.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).)

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(Jury present)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

We have had no proclamation this morning. usually do, and I had prior proceedings before court opened before you arrived here, and I mention that because I don't want you to think that this part of the trial is not an important part of the trial.

There is no point in comparing the relative importance, I suppose, but just as I asked you to pay close attention yesterday to what the attorneys have had to say, I ask you to pay close attention today and it may require greater concentration because I may be using some fancy words, not, permans, as bad as mass spectomatry, and things like that, but technical words, and you will have to be paying close attention to what is said.

I wish it were possible simply to chat with you and tell you what the law is, because I think in that fashion I communicate better and you perhaps can listen more easily, but the law has become rather complicated, like everything else in life, and we want to be very careful in matters of this kind that we don't make any mistakes, so it is pretty much the custom, at least in this court, and I think more and more throughout the country now, that we put what we have to tell the jury

in writing, and I will be reading it.

If I read too fast, and the reporters have sometimes told me I have a tendency to do that, so that you don't get the full significance of what I am saying, please raise your hand and let me know and I will hear that in mind.

This is a fairly long charge of about 50 pages. I think you can listen to it and absorb it easily enough in one sitting, but if you find your attention flagging, or any difficulty in that regard, also please raise your hand and we will take five minutes inbetween then I will resume.

Now, before I start reading my charge I want to tell you as was indicated yesterday that although Mr. Lam Man Chung, the defendant at the table here who is wearing the dark glasses, was originally charged in the conspiracy, count number 1 of this indictment, for reasons that are not of your concern that charge no longer applies to him. Therefore, my instructions with regard to the conspiracy count when I come to them will relate only to Mr. Lai and Mr. Chea.

The second point that I wanted to make was that yesterday in his closing statement fir. Bannigan referred to Mr. Sang as a defendant in this case. That was an

inaccuracy. Mr. Sang is charged as a co-conspirator in the indictment here, but he is not charged as a defendant.

the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the time has come to instruct you as to the law governing the case. You have been chosen and sworn as jurors in this matter to try the issues presented by the allegations of the indictment and on your determination of the facts, and I stress the word "your" to decide under the law as I shall instruct you whether any of the defendants has or has not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any

I will discuss those charges with you in a moment in detail, but first I want to say that you are to perform your duties as jurors without bias or prejudice to or for anybody, whether the government or any of the defendants.

The law does not permit jurors, and you wouldn't want it to permit jurors, to be governed either by sympathy or swayed by prejudice or public opinion.

Now, we start with the proposition that we started with at the outset of this trial, that is, that the law presumes every defendant to be innocent of any charge against him. You will recall that when you were

selected, I specifically asked each one of you if you could enter into the discharge of your duties presuming each defendant to be innocent unless proven quilty beyond a reasonable doubt after your own deliberations, and each of you gave me the answer, yes.

This presumption of innocence is sufficient to acquit any defendant unless and until you as jurors have unanimously satisfied yourselves beyond a reasonable downt of that defendant's guilt from all of the evidence which has been presented.

The burden, or responsibility, is on the government to prove each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of each crime charged, and I will advise you later in this charge just what elements there are to each crime.

I also want to remind you of what I mentioned at the outset of the trial, that is that the existence of an indictment does not constitute evidence against any defendant, but is merely a method of bringing a charge against him.

Now, I have said, the lawyers have said many, many times throughout this case, that the government has assumed the responsibility of proving each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Let me define that

important term for you at the outset.

you feel that you should have.

A reasonable downt is not a vague, speculative or imaginative downt. It is a downt which, as the phrase suggests, is based on reason which comes either from the evidence that you have heard or from the lack of evidence. That is, what you haven't heard or seen that

It is a doubt which a reasonable man or woman might entertain. It is a doubt, and I think this is the best definition, which would cause reasonable men and prudent men and women like yourselves to hesitate to act in relation to matters of importance in your own private lives.

Let us say that you have an important decision to make. How do you go about making that decision? You think about everything that you know about it. You think about everything that you would want to know, that you haven't been told about it. And you say to yourself, do I have enough information? Do I have enough dependable information so that I am ready to act?

If you say, I don't, then you have a downt.

I would describe it as a reasonable downt. If you say,

I do, then you are prepared to make a decision whichever
way it is.

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A mere suspicion will not justify a conviction. Suspicion is no substitute for evidence. Nor is it sufficient to convict if you find that the circumstances merely render the guilty of an accused to be probable. The law does not deal in probabilities.

Since the burden, or responsibility, is on the prosecution to prove the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the crime charged, a defendant has the right to rely on the failure of the prosecution to establish such proof.

A defendant may also, of course, rely upon evidence brought out on cross-examination of government witnesses and on the testimony of his own witnesses.

In saying that the government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, if there is to be a conviction, I do not mean to say that the government is required to prove guilt beyond all possible doubt. Indeed, in human affairs it is hard to think of anything that we can prove beyond all possible doubt. But the proof must be of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act on it in the most important decisions of your own affairs.

Now, the evidence in this case, as I have told you a number of times, consists of the testimony of the

witnesses, the exhibits which have been received in evidence and facts which have been stipulated, or agreed to by counsel.

You have to decide the case based solely on the evidence, but in your consideration of the evidence you are not limited to the bald statements of the witnesses here. By using the word "bald" I don't mean to suggest anything adverse to any witness, but I mean you are entitled to, and you must think behind the mere words that were uttered.

In deciding the many questions before you it is your job to determine the credibility of the witnesses the have testified before you in this case. Now, now do you go about that? Perhaps the best answer is to say that you determine the truthfulness or accuracy or weight to be given to a witness' testimony in the same way that you would determine such questions in your own personal affairs.

We are all constantly called upon from day to day to determine how much confidence we place in the statements that people make to us. The truthfulness or dependability of a witness, as that of any other person, can be determined by his demeanor, that is, his look, his relationship to the case and to the parties, the possibility of

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his being biased or partial, or of his not being biased or partial. The stake that he may have in the outcome of the case. The reasonableness or unreasonableness of his statements. The extent or weakness of his recollection. And the extent to which what he has said has been either corroborated or contradicted by testimony of other witnesses or by exhibits or stipulations.

In ordinary life when you need to determine the truthfulness of a person you ask yourself, don't you, as you would here, how did he impress me? Did his version appear straightforward and candid? Or, did he seem to be trying to hide some of the facts? Did he have any motive to testify falsely? Or, know a motive of that kind?

The ultimate question for you to decide on in passing on the credibility of any witness is, did he tell the truth before me? It is for jurors alone to determine the weight to be given the testimony of a witness, and in making these suggestions I have to you, I have given you guidelines only and have not attempted to dictate or suggest how you should apply those guidelines.

If you find that any witness has wilfully testified falsely as to any material or significant matter,

R.

not some matter which you believe to be unimportant, you may reject the entire testimony of the witness, or you may accept such portion of it as you believe, and reject the remainder.

Now, a few rules that apply particularly to this case. In judging the credibility of a witness you are entitled to consider his status and his interest, if any, in the outcome of the case.

In this trial the witnesses, other than Dr. Shapiro, Mr. Chea's sister, and Mrs. Moy have been government employeees.

A witness' testimony is, of course, not to be given any greater or any less weight simply because the witness is either a government witness or a government employee.

While you may not assume that a government agent or chemist necessarily has an interset in the outcome of the case, his status is a fact among others which you may consider in determining how convincing you find his testimony to be.

Similarly, if you found that Dr. Shapiro or Mr. Chea's sister had an interest in the outcome of this case, you may bear that in mind in weighing the value of his or her testimony.

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One point as to Agent Maher's testimony. He was permitted by the Court to remain in the courtroom while other witnesses testified. There were good reasons for allowing him to do so. However, in judging his testimony you may consider this fact and give it as much or as little weight as you believe it deserves.

As to the testimony of the expert witnesses, a few special words are in order. Expert witnesses have testified in this case as you know. In determining what weight you should give to their opinions you may consider their experience, their educational background, their understanding of scientific discipline and the knowledge that they have gained from professional activity and study.

You should consider each expert opinion received in evidence in this case and give it such weight as you think it deserves, accepting it in whole or in part, or rejecting it as you see fit if you conclude that the reasons given in support of that opinion are not sound.

An expert witness, as I think I instructed you during the course of the trial, may give his opinion, and it is normally, as it has been in this case, based on assumptions as stated by him.

If you find that the assumptions needed to support

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the opinion are not good, you may disregard the opinion.

Now, the government has introduced in this case certain admissions, or statements of Mr. Lai. Admissions of a defendant are regarded as very strong proof in the law. Accordingly you are entitled to give great weight to the defendant Lai's admissions in this case.

However, among the issues of fact to be decided by you is the issue of whether the statements given by Mr. Lai were given knowingly, and it is the job, or responsibility of the government to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that such statements were knowingly made, and if you find that they were not knowingly made you must disregard those statements.

Now, a statement is knowingly made if it is made voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of pressure or coersion.

In determining whether any statement made by Mr.Lai was knowing, you should take into consideration all of the evidence surrounding the making of the statement including whether in your view it has been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Lai was properly advised of his rights before he made the statements which he acknowledged he did.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, as I have said your determination in this case must be made upon the evidence. There are generally speaking two types of evidence, or two definitions are least, or categories of evidence from which you may properly find the facts of the case. I am sure you have heard them referred to often. One is called direct evidence. That is the evidence of an eyewitness, or an earwitness. I have heard it, I have seen it directly. The other is indirect, or more generally called circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is defined as the proof of a chain of events or circumstances which points to the existence or non-existence of certain facts as to which there was no eyewitness or earwitness.

The law makes no distinction as to the importance or weight of circumstantial or direct evidence just because it is either circumstantial on the one hand or direct on the other. It requires only that you the jury find the facts in accordance with all the evidence in the case, both direct and circumstantial, beyond a reasonable doubt.

An example by the way, of the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence would be the following, an example which is given to juries time after time, which is a pretty vivid one, I think, and, therefore, I

will use it too:

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If you look out of the window, not today, but on a different day, and see it is raining, that is direct evidence that it is raining. On the other hand, if all the blinds were drawn in this room, which Mr. Rosential pointed out is below sea level anyway, and somebody came through the door overthere with a dripping umbrella, that would be pretty good circumstantial evidence that it was raining outside: You wouldn't have seen with your own eyes, but you would have the right to infer seeing a man coming through the door with a dripping umbrella that it was raining outside. To be sure, he might have been standing in a shower in one of the rooms in this wilding that has a shower, but that is highly unlikely, and the other inference is the likely one.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, that example is given to you to help you in making the inferences that you will have to make based on the circumstantial evidence in this case.

Ladies and gentlemen, both the United States attorney and defense counsel have from time to time throughout the course of the trial, although comparatively rarely Imust say, objected in this case to the introduction of evidence and addressed arguments to the bench.

such objections when the attorney believes that the other side is proposing to but into evidence or ask questions about something that is not properly admissible.

I want you to know that when I have sustained an objection to a question, or when I have overruled an objection to a question, that doesn't indicate in any way any attitude of mind toward the merits or outcome of this case, or how you should decide it.

What it means and the only thing it means, is that when I have sustained an objection you are to disregard the question and drawn no inference from the wording of the question as to what a witness might have answered had I allowed him to do so.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, that I have instructed you as to the manner in which you should consider the evidence, and since you have heard a very long summary of the respective contentions of defense counsel and Mr. Bannigan on the part of the government, I will turn to the substance of the charges against the defendants here.

The indictment in this case contains six counts. Each count is a separate crime and charge, and each of them must be considered separately by the jury as to each defendant who is named in that count.

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Each of the defendants is not named in every count, but in fact Mr. Chung, Lan Man Chung, is now only named in one count, Count 5.

Mr. Chea is named in Counts 1, 2 and 4, and Mr. Lai in Counts 1, 2, 3 and 6.

This is as good a time as any for me to tell you that to assist you when you do make your decisions one way or the other, I have prepared what are known as verdict lists, one for each defendant so that when you have reached a conclusion, Mr. Foreman, you can simply fill in a blank of not guilty or guilty as to that charge for that defendant.

As you will recall, the indictment names four defendants in all, Mr. Lai, Mr. Chea, Mr. Lan Man Chung and Mrs. Lai. Mrs. Lai is no longer on trial for reasons that have nothing to do with the charges against or the defenses for the present defendants. So the only persons on trial before you now are the three with whom you have become acquainted. Although, as I will explain to you shortly, in considering their guilt or innocence you may have to determine the nature of the participation, if any, of others.

In the determination of innocence or guilt on all the charges you must bear in mind that guilt is

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personal. The guilt or innocence of a defendant on trial before you must be determined separately with respect to him solely on the evidence presented against him or the lack of evidence against him.

the proof or lack of proof of the charges against nim, and not against somebody else. Therefore, the fact that another person named in the indictment is not on trial before you is not evidence of the guilt of any other defendant or that the crimes charged were committed. It may not be considered by you in any respect against the defendants. Nor may any adverse inference be drawn against these defendants by reason of that fact.

The guilt or innocence of the defendants on trial must be determined by you beyond a reasonable doubt solely on the evidence against them and not someone else.

Now, having got that important generality, but it is a generality, out of the way, let me come to the charges against the defendants.

The first count of the indictment, the so-called conspiracy charge which applies now only to Mr. Lai and Mr. Chea, charges that from on or about the 1st of July, 1972, up to and including the date of the filing of the indictment here, which was about September 28th, 1973,

that is a couple of months ago, Ar. Lai, Ars. Lai and Ar. Lan Man Chung, and also Ar. Chong Wing Chung, who has been identified separately as Ar. Sang, I believe, who is named as a co-conspirator, not as a defendant, and others who are not known to the grand jury, conspired together to violate the Federal Marcotics Laws.

It is further charged that it was part of the conspiracy, that is the object of the conspiracy, to distribute and possess with intention to distribute what we lawyers in a fancy way call schedule 1 and 2 narcotic drug controlled substances. These substances about which I will explain more at a later point during these instructions include heroin.

For ease of understanding I will hereafter refer to this count as the conspiracy charge.

The second through sixth counts inclusive charge that on or about the date specificified in each charge the defendant named in those charges or counts unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly distributed or possessed with intent to distribute, heroin, schedule 1 narcotic drug controlled substances to wit, heroin.

Before considering the legal principles with respect to each of these charges keep in mind, as I told you, that each charge is separate and distinct from the

others.

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Now let us turn to the first charge, the con-

Mr. Lai under the conspiracy charge you must find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following elements: First, you must find the existence of the conspiracy charged. Obviously nobody can be guilty of a conspiracy unless there was a conspiracy as charged in the indictment. Secondly, you must find that the defendant whose guilt or innocence you are considering at that time knowingly and wilfully associated himself with the conspiracy, or joined it; third, you must find that at least one of the conspirators committed at least one of the so-called overt acts about which we heard yesterday and which I will tell you more about shortly, that are specified in the indictment.

If the government fails to establish each of these essential elements, or all of those essential elements, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must acquit the defendant whose guilt or innocence you are considering on that point.

If it succeeds in proving all of those things, however, then of course it is your duty to convict that

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defendant.

· Now, the jist of the crime of conspiracy is the unlawful agreement to violate the law. Whether or not the defendant accomplished what it is alleged he and the others conspired to do is immaterial to the question of his guilt or innocence, if a conspiracy does not come to fruition. It is the very conspiracy itself together with at least the commission of one overt act that completes the crime.

. A conspiracy has often been called a partnership in criminal purpose in which each member becomes the agent of every other member: " of the second

To establish the existence of a conspiracy the government is not required to show that two or more persons have sat around a table and entered into a solemn compact orally or in writing stating that they have formed a conspiracy to violate the law and setting forth the details of their plans. Indeed it would be extraordinary, obviously, if there were such a formal document or specific oral agreement.

Your common sense will tell you that when a man in fact undertakes to enter into a criminal conspiracy, which by definition means an agreement to violate the law, they are not going to announce it from the house-

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tops. And much is left to the understanding.

Conspirators don't usually reduce their agreements to writing or swear to them before a Notary Public.

It is sufficient if the government establishes to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more persons in any manner through any contrivance, impliedly or tacitly or explicitly come to a common understanding to violate the law. Express language or specific words are not required to indicate assent or attachment to a conspiracy. Nor is it required that you find that all of the conspirators alleged in the indictment joined in the conspiracy in order to find that the conspiracy existed, but obviously you must find that at least two people did, or you can't have a conspiracy.

In determining whether there has been an unlawful agreement you may judge the acts and conduct of the
alleged co-conspirators which are done to carry out an
apparent criminal purpose. The maxim that action speaks
louder than words is applicable here.

Often the only evidence available is that of disconnected acts which, however, when taken together in connection with each other show a conspiracy to secure a particular result as satisfactorily and conclusively as more direct proof.

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The offense is complete when the unlawful agreement is made, and any single overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy is thereafter committed by at least one of the co-conspirators.

Proof concerning the accomplishment of the objects of conspiracy may be the most persuasive evidence of the existence of the conspiracy itself. If you believe that this alleged venture was successful, that may be the best proof of the existence of the agreement.

In determing whether the conspiracy charged here actually existed you may consider the evidence of the acts and conduct of the alleged conspirators as a whole, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from such evidence. If upon consideration of the evidence you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minds of at least two of the alleged conspirators met in an understanding way and that they agreed, as I have explained a conspiratorial agreement to you, to work together in furtherance of the unlawful scheme alleged in the idictment, then proof of the existence of the conspiracy is complete. That is the first element.

Now, you must find that at least two of the alleged conspirators agreed to distribute heroin, or

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possess it for distribution. It would make no difference, however, if what they actually distributed or possessed for distribution was not in fact heroin on the first count, as long as you find beyond a reasonable downt that the conspiracy agreed and planned to distribute heroin or possess it for distribution.

As to the substantive counts to which I am coming, it makes all the difference whether they actually distributed heroin or not, but as to the first count you are not required to find that they actually did distribute heroin, so long as you do find that they actually agreed to distribute or possess for distribution neroin.

I am still talking about conspiracy now, and
I am about to tell you about the second element which
is required to be proven in order to find a conviction.
That is, membership in the conspiracy, individual membership in the conspiracy.

If you do conclude that a conspiracy as charged did exist, you must next determine whether the defendant whose guilt you are considering, that is either Mr. Lai or Mr. Chea, as the case will be, was a member or became a member, whether he participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purposes and in furtherance of its unlawful objectives.

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you must find that he knowingly and intentionally participated in it. Thus mere knowledge by defendant of the existence of the conspiracy or of any illegal act on the part of another alleged co-conspirator, or mere association with one or more of the conspirators, is not sufficient to establish membership in the conspiracy.

The government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant under question was aware of the basic purposes and objects of the conspiracy, that he entered into it with a specific criminal intent, that is, with a purpose to violate the law.

So if a defendant with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy intentionally engages, advises or assists for the purpose of furthering the illegal undertaking, then he becomes a knowing and wilful participant, a conspirator.

In determining whether a defendant was a member of a conspiracy you may consider, of course, all of the evidence before you.

Now, the guilt of a conspirator, if you found that there was a conspiracy and he joined it, is not governed by the extent or duration of his participation in the conspiracy, or whether he had knowledge of all of

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its operations. Even if one joined the conspiracy after it was formed and was engaged in it to a degree more limited than that of some other co-conspirator, he may still be found guilty of conspiracy.

Each member of the conspiracy may perform, and usually does, separate and distinct acts at different times and different places. Some conspirators obviously play more important roles than others. But it is not required for the proof of the elements we have been talking about that a person be a member of the conspiracy from its very start. He may join it at any point during its progress and he would then be held responsible for all that has been done before he joined and all that would be done by the conspirators in pursuance of the conspiracy thereafter, during its existence and while he remains a member.

simply stated, again using the partnerhsip analogy, a partner assumes the liability of the partnership, including those that occurred before he became a member. Thus if you find that a given defendant is a conspirator, that is, became a member of it knowingly, then however limited his role in further the objectives of the conspiracy he is responsible for all that was done in furtherance thereof before or during the continuance

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of the conspiracy while he is a member.

Now we come to the last element with regard to conspiracy, and that is the question of overt acts.

Assuming that you have found that a conspiracy existed and that a defendant whom you are consideringwas a member of that conspiracy, or became a member of it knowingly, then the question arises whether any of the co-conspirators committed at least one overt act ir furtherance of the conspiracy.

act is not inconsequential. It is that while parties might conspire and agree to violate the law, they could, and they do, change their minds and do nothing to carry it out. In that case no crime would be committed. You and I can sit here and plan to blow up the capitol of the United States and talk about it for days on end, but if we never do anything about it, that is not a crime.

The moment, however, that one of the co-conspirators does something in furtherance of the crime, then the crime is complete.

Now, it is true, as was indicated yesterday, that overt acts as listed in this indictment generally speaking are not necessarily criminal in themselves. That does not mean, however, of course, that an action taken

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may not be sufficiently weighty to be in furtherance of the crime.

If I phone you in connection with our plan to blow up the capitol of the United States and suggest that we meet at a certain time and place, while it may be perfectly normal to telephone people, that would be an act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

An over act need not be a criminal act, nor the very crime which is the subject of the conspiracy. It is not necessary to the government to prove that each member of the conspiracy committed or participated in any particular over act since the act of any one done in furtherance of the conspiracy becomes the act of all the other members.

Also the government is not required to prove each of the overt acts—alleged in the indictment. It is sufficient if it proves the commission of at least one of the acts by one of the conspirators in the Southern District of New York, which includes this city.

Now, the five evert acts here I will read to you so that you will be acquainted with them in case you have any difficulty interpreting if that is the right word to use, the indictment when you have it in your possession.

They are that first on or about July 11, 1973, Mr. and Mrs. Lai entered The National Bank of North America at 44 Wall Street, New York; second, that Mr. Lai met Mr. Chea in the vicinity of 177 Chrystie Street, New York, Nev York on July 11, the same day; third, that on or about July 11, the same day, Mr. Lai, Mrs. Lai and Mr. Chea entered 261 Broome Street, New York, New York; fourth, that on the same day Lan Man Chung, also known as Ja B. Lam, entered 261 Broome Street and; fifth and final, that Mr. Chung, also known as Ja B. Lam, entered 261 Broome Street, New York, on July 11, 1973.

Now, while this indictment charges that the conspiracy existed from on or about the 1st day of July and conminuously thereafter up to and including September 28, 1973, which is the date of the indictment, it is not essential as a matter of law that the government prove that the conspiracy started and ended precisely on those dates. It is sufficient if you find that in fact a conspiracy was formed and existed for some time within the period set forth in the indictment, and that at least one of the overt acts was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy within that period.

A conspiracy once formed is presumed to have continued until its object is accomplished, or until there

is an affirmative act of termination by its members, or it is otherwise clearly terminated, as for example, by arrest of the defendants here.

So, too, once a person is found to be a member of a conspiracy, he is presumed to continue his member-snip until the termination of the conspiracy, unless there is affirmative proof of his withdrawal or his disassociation from it.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, I have finished instructing you with regard to conspiracy. We come now to the law with regard to the other counts.

The second through sixth counts of the indictment, that is the substantive, as we call them, counts,
charged the defendants with the unlawful distribution,
or possession with intent to distribute, varying amounts
of heroin as more specifically set forth in each count.

The statute which the defendants named in the substantive narcotics count are alleged to have violated, is Section 841(a)1 of the United States Code. The text is set forth here. I will read it briefly, although I think by now you have heard enough about this. That section reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

"It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to distribute, or possess with intent to

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districute, a controlled substance."

of those counts, 2 through 6, you must be convinced that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following elements of the crime: First, that on or about the date alleged in the particular count the defendant under consideration at that time either distributed or possessed with intent to distribute a narcotic drug controlled substance;

Second, that the substance distributed or possessed with intent to distribute, as set forth in that count, was in fact a schedule 1 narcotic drug controlled substance, namely, heroin;

Third, that the defendant under consideration did what he did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly.

You will note that the first element of the offense is to distribute or possess with intent to distribute the drug. What does that phrase mean? Well, the word "distribute" means, as you would expect it to, to transfer or deliver, other than by administering or dispensing, the narcotic controlled substance. It is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant actually distributed the narcotic drug controlled substance, only that he either distributed it or that he

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possessed it with the intention to distribute it, on or about the date charged.

Now, the law recognizes two kinds of possession, and I think probably we do in our daily lives, too, although we are rot so conscious of it.

this piece of paper in my hand. I possess it. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is then in actual possession of it. But a person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has the power, the power at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing is then in what the law calls constructive possession of it.

The law recognizes also the possession may be sole or joint. That is, a thing may be possessed by one person or by more than one person. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole.

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the accused, either alone or jointly with others had actual or constructive possession of the substances described in the count under consideration, then you may find that such substance was in the possession of the accused within the meaning of the word possession of the wor

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tribute", refers to a person's state of mind, of course.

So the term "distribute" or "managed to the term "distribute" or

ion as used in these instructions and used in the law.

So the term "distribute" or "possess with intent to distribute" can be fairly stated to mean to possess or to control an item with the state of mind or purpose of transferring or delivering that item.

The word "intent", that is "with intent to dis-

The second element you must find beyond reasonable doubt with regard to Counts 2 through 6, if there is to be a conviction of any defendant, is that the alleged narcotic drug controlled substance which the defendant possessed with intent to distribute was heroin. I instruct you as a matter of law that heroin is a schedule 1 narcotic drug controlled substance.

You, however, must still find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance which either of the defendants, any of the defendants here possessed or distributed was heroin.

The third element, and I will say more about that hereafter, the third element which you must find with regard to the Counts 2 through 6 if you are to convict any defendant is that their act was taken unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly or intentionally.

Those words means that you must be satisfied

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant whose guilt you are considering knew what he was doing, and he did it deliberately and voluntarily as opposed to mistakenly or accidentally, under a mistake, or under a mistaken assumption.

no proof here that Mr. Ja B. Lam knew what were the contents of the package which it is claimed that he had in his possession that day. If you believe that Mr. Ja B. Lam did not know what was in that package, you would be required to acquit because in order to find any of the defendants guilty on the so-called substantive counts, or on the conspiracy count, you must determine beyond a reasonable doubt in your mind that that defendant knew what he was doing and intended to do it.

Knowledge and intent exist in the mind. It is not possible to look into a person's mind to see what goes on. Accordingly, the only way you have for arriving at a decision in these questions is to take into consideration as you do all the time in your daily lives the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence, including the exhibits, and to determine from all such facts and circumstances whether the requisite knowledge and intent were proven to

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you beyond a reasonable downt.

Direct proof is unnecessary. The only way you could get direct proof of a person's intention is for him to have said, or somebody else to have testified that he said, I meant to do that. Of course that rarely occurs in any case. But knowledge and intent may be inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances.

Now there is an alternate basis on which finding of guilt may be found. But it still requires proof of a high degree which I will now describe to you.

Any person who commits an act in violation of a criminal statute, of course, commits a crime. But it." is also a crime not only to commit an illegal act; wat? to aid or apet another person to commit that act. second crime, if you want to call it a separate crime,. or second basis for being held liable for crime, is the legal principle that anyone who aids or abets an other to commit an illegal act is himself guilty of committing that act.

Accordingly, if you should find beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the defendants named in Counts 2 through 6, or any of their co-conspirators, committed a crime, and that another defendant aided or abetted that defendant or co-conspirator, you would have

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a sufficient basis for finding the guilt of the second.

Now, what does this mean? To find that a defendant aided or abetted another to commit a crime you must find that the aiding and betting defendant in some positive clear way associated himself with the criminal venture, that he participated in it not just casually, but as something he clearly wished to bring about.

In other words, he sought by his action to make the venture succeed. Thus to find a defendant guilty of aiding and abetting you must of course find something more than mere knowledge on his part that a crime was being committed. For a mere spectator at a crime is not a participant. But, in order to convict it is not necessary that you find that a defendant nimself did all the acts.

Now you very well recall that the second element of the crime charged here is that the substance distributed, or possessed withintent to distribute, as set forth in Counts 2 through 6 of the indictment, was a so-called schedule 1 narcotic drug controlled substance. I have told you that heroin is such a substance. However, the defendants have vigorously contested, as you of course know, whether the substances introduced in evidence are

in fact heroin.

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In order to convict any defendant on the substantive counts, that is Counts 2 through 6, I want to make it clear that you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance referred to in that particular count is heroin. It is not sufficient as to those counts that the defendant and others acted as through they believed the substance was heroin. You remember I told you that it was sufficient if under the conspiracy counts the defendants planned or agreed to distribute heroin even if it turned out that they did not distribute that.

But, as to these substantive counts it is not sufficient if they acted as though they believed the substance was heroin. Nor is a suspicion on your part that the substance was heroin, a suspicion that it was heroin, sufficient to find the defendants guilty.

You may not speculate as to the identity of the substance. If you have a reasonable doubt that the substance was or was not, whichever way you look at it, diacytal morphine, that is heroin, then you must find the defendant not guilty on the count involved.

Now we come to another subject which applies to the case of Mr. Chea. The defendant Juan Pang Chea, as you heard yesterday, asserts a defense to the charge that

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he was the victim of entrapment by an agent of the government. The word "entrapment" is a legal term and it perhaps is somewhat different than the normal lay attitude, but it incorporates an awful lot of common experience and sense, and sense of fairness and propriety, it seems to me. It has a technical meaning however, and I want to go into that.

Criminal activity is sometimes such that stealth and strategy are necessary methods to be used, or at least approvable methods to be used by law enforcement officers. The function of law enforcement is not only the prevention of crime, but also the detection and the apprecionation of criminals.

The defense of entrapment is based upon the policy that law enforcement agencies should not manufacture crime, or corrupt persons, or tempt persons to commit crimes in order to prosecute and convict them.

But, a line must be drawn, and this is the line you would expect ought to be drawn, between corrupting a willing criminal on the one hand and corrupting the unwilling person and laying a trap for him on the other side.

Law enforcement agents often use undercover investigations and informants in enforcing the law. Such

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methods are not forbidden by law. But a basic feature of the entrapment concept is that the idea, or design of committing crimes originated with the law enforcement officer rather than with the defendant, and that the defendant had no previous disposition, intent or purpose of committing the alleged offense. And that the law enforcement officer, or government employee, implanted in the mind of the defendant the disposition to commit the alleged offense.

If you find that an agent or employee of the government merely afforded a favorable opportunity to a defendant who was already willing, ready and able to commit a crime, that conduct on the part of the government would not constitute a defense of entrapment for the defendant.

The test that you should apply is this: If
you find in the first instance some believable or credible
evidence that a government agent by initiating the illegal
conduct, himself induced Juan Pang Chea to transfer the
narcotics on the occasions charged in this indictment,
then and only then the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that such inducement did not even so
the cause or creator of the crime.

That is, the government must prove that without

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such inducement Chea was already ready and willing to commit the crime.

I know sometimes this charge causes problems for the jurors, and I want to be sure that they understand.

reasonable doubt that the defendant Chea was ready and willing to commit the offense as charged, and was waiting a favorable opportunity to do so, then you may find even if there was an inducement which brought about the actual events, that that inducement was no more than providing of what appeared to the defendant to be a favorable or convenient opening or opportunity to commit the crime, and in such circumstances you may find that the government's agent has only provided a means for a defendant to realize his own then existing purpose.

If the government proves that to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defense fails.

To sustain, or assume its burden, the government makes three basic points and I am now telling you what their contentions are, I am not sponsoring them, I ambringing them to your attention, and I am not dissponsoring them, either, I am simply bringing them to your attention.

First, the government contends that Juan Pang
Chea had a plan or design to sell drugs prior to any
contact with the agent. In this regard the government
contends that Juan Pang Chea's ready access to large
scale scarces of supply of heroin shows an already formed
design to sell drugs.

Second, the government contends that the evidence shows that Juan Pang Chea was in no way reluctant to sell drugs, but responded readily and willingly to the opportunity presented to him.

In this regard the government points to Juan Pang Chea's ready willingness to discuss the sale of large quantities of heroin at his first meetings with Agent Quarequio and Agent Tripp.

Chea sold approximately one pound of heroin to Lan Man Chung, that is also Ja B. Lam, on July 11, 1973, and that he said, on June 14, 1973, that Lam had asked to become his partner in the heroin business, and that these facts, if you believe them to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, circumstantially show that Chea was in the heroin business and was willing to sell drugs whenever the opportunity to do so presented itself without participation by the government.

Now, Juan Pang Chea, on the other hand, contends that the government has failed to sustain its burden that he was ready and willing to commit the crime charged without persuasion. He argues that there is no proof that he had a plan or design to sell drugs prior to any contact with an informer, and aside from what he told the agents there is no proof that he ever engaged in this type of activity before April 30, 1973.

He further argues that the tape recording made of the June 29th meeting, I believe between nimself and Agent Quarequio, indicates clearly Chea's hesitance to sell the drugs, and that it was necessary for Agent Quarequio to put forth a lot of effort to persuade him to go through with the deal, despite all his brave talk that preceded that.

As I told you, I didn't sponsor the government's contentions, I don't sponsor Mr. Chea's contentions, but I bring them to your attention.

Ladies and gentlemen, in every criminal case there is a fundamental rule which every defendant has the right to rely on. That is the rule that no defendant is compelled to take the witness stand or offer any testimony whatsoever.

Pleading not guilty a defendant has in effect

denied the charges on which he is being tried and denied every material issue against him stated in the indictment. It is the prosecution which must prove him guilty and he can't be required to testify or disprove anything.

Any accused person has the right to stand mute. The fact that he does not take the stand, as the defendants in this case have not, may not be considered by you as any indication of guilt or as an admission of guilt or as evidence or inference of guilt.

Now, that is not just an artificial rule. If
you were accused of a crime you would feel that there was
no reason for you to prove your innocence. However thorough
ly you are convinced of that innocence, or knew of it,
you would understand that it was the government's job
to prove you guilty, if it could.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, under your oath as jurors you cannot allow a consideration of the punishment which might be imposed upon a defendant if convicted to influence your verdict in any way or to enter into your deliberations at all.

Let me say, ladies and gentlemen, that I rarely talk about this subject when I charge a jury because I don't think it is a subject that should enter into the jury's mind at all. I must talk about it frankly in this

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case because with perfect propriety on both sides it
has been broughtwinto evidence in relation to what
was told to Mr. Lai at the time that he was arrested,
namely that he and his wife theoretically could be subject
to 30 years imprisonment if they were convicted here.

We have different jobs, you and I, ladies and gentlemen, as I explained yesterday, in carrying out our responsibilities in this case. Your job is to determine, make findings of fact, and apply the law here and determine, but only determine whether the defendants here are guilty or they are not guilty. I have no desire whatsoever to influence you in the making of that decision. I believe thoroughly in the integrity of the jury system in making such determinations. But I have an equal responsibility with which you have no right to interfere and which you have no right to consider in making your decision.

I expect you to carry out your job as you should, and if it ever becomes necessary for me to do so, I will carry out mine.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have come very near the end of my formal instructions. The most important part of this case is the part which you now as jurors are to play, because it is for you and your alone to

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decide whether any of these defendants is guilty on any count charged.

I know that you will try the issues that have been presented to you in accordance with the oath that you took as jurors in which you promised that you would well and truly try the issues joined in this case.

I like that phrase, it goes back one thousand years, and its old fashioned flavor should mean something to you and remind you of the hundreds of thousands of juries who have performed this function before you, and that you must a true verdict render based upon the evidence you heard in this court, and the exhibits.

In order for you to reach a verdict of either not guilty or guilty on any count, on any defendant, your verdict must, of course, be unanimous. That is, everybody must agree as to that particular verdict.

Now, inspite of that requirement of unanimity, each of you must decide each count as to each defendant individually in accordance with your own conscience. But only after deliberation with your fellow jurors to determine whether you believe a just verdict is being reached.

You shouldn't hesitate to change your mind if you become convinced that your original view of the case

was not in accordance with the facts and the law.

On the other hand, you shouldn't change your mind just for the purpose of reaching a verdict as a matter of convenience. I haven't any reason to believe that this jury won't be able to reach a unanimous verdict one way or the other as to the matters put before them.

Nothing that I have said in these instructions, whatever it may be, is intended to indicate any view of mine towards how the various issues put before you should be decided.

Ladies and gentlemen, in accordance with custom, Juror No. 1, Mr. Weiner, will act as your foreman. If you have any questions or wish to have any of the testimony read back to you, or wish to look at any of the exhibits, you may simply send a written note or message to that effect through the marshal who will have you in custody, who will be right outside your door, and he will make the necessary arrangements.

If you do wish to have any testimony read back to you, or any exhibit, it would be helpful if you could be as specific as possible about the material that you are interested in so that we can be assisted in locating that material.

I am neither encouraging nor discouraging your

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that you are fully entitled to it. I do not intend, as occasionally occurs, to send all the exhibits in to you and plunk them down on the table. There are an awful lot of exhibits here. The substances that are before you you may or may not wish to have in your presence.

The large amounts of money, I think it would be foolish for you to have in your presence. Just so there is no confusion about it. But you certainly are free to examine them to your heart's content if you wish to do so.

Now ladies and gentlemen, I have come to the end of my instructions. I will meet for a moment with the attorneys in the robing room to see if they think that anything in my instructions needs clarification or correction and we will be right back after we have spent a moment or two together.

(In the robing room)

THE COURT: Mr. Pykett? Do you have any requests or objections?

MR. PYKETT: Your Honor, there is only one issue that I am not really sure needs correcting and that was in the government's requests for participation in the conspiracy. This is government's request number 8. You added the word "while he is a member."

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I correctly added them because we were talking about the responsibility of a conspirator, and although he may have joined only a day before and been responsible for anything that was done prior to his joining, if he quits the day after he can't be responsible for what follows, and to avoid any suggestion that he could be responsible for what happened after he left the conspiracy I added those words.

MR. PYKETT: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Rosenthal?

MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, basically, your Honor,
I most respectfully accept and object, both to the reading by you to the jury of overt acts 4 and 5 --

THE COURT: Why is that?

MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, Mr. Lam is no longer charged with conspiracy.

conspirator, as a matter of law, it seems to me. I don't think it makes any difference whose name is there. If you want me to tell the jury to disregard those, I don't feel very strongly about it, and I am sure that you don't think that the case is really going to turn on that, but if you want me to I will.

MR. FISHER: Your Monor, may I comment on that? Most respectfully, I think in view of the Court's himmaissing of Count I as against Lam that's a finding that there is no proof that he is a co-conspirator because if he were a co-conspirator you couldn't have dismissed. So I think mr. Rosenthal is quite correct here and —

true. I don't know that I want to spend all day arguing about it, because I think never having really given it much thought, admittedly, that I could simply have determined as I did that the government hasn't proven its case beyond a reasona is doubt. But, in any event, unless ar. Pylett has scrong feelings about that, he may not know, or — you were here this morning while I mentioned it, Mr. Pykett, that I have dismissed the conspiracy charge against Mr. Lam and therefore I would be glad to instruct the jury without arguing with you that they should disregard it. They are there anyway visually.

MR. FISHER: I would suggest disregard any comments about Lam with respect to the conspiracy count.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FISHER: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. ROSENTHAL: I have nothing else.

MR. RASSNER: I have no exceptions, but I would

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of entrapment was indicated to apply to the July 11th and the coaspiracy count as well as the June 29th dount.

I believe that the proof does disclose that it could all be part of one course of conduct, and I think that subject made —

THE COURT: If that is part of your claim, I will just -- I will state that you claim it applies to all counts against you.

MR. RASSNER: Yes, I would appreciate that very much, your Honor.

THE COURT. I dian't mean to confuse must you ---

MR. FISHER: If your Honor please, first I respectfully except to the failure of the Court to charge those requested charges which were submitted to your Honor.

THE COURT: I assume there is an exception to all --

MR. ROSENTHAL: I understood we did that yesterday, your Honor, that's why I didn't bother doing it today.

MR. FISHER: If your Honor please, most respectfully I think we have been trying to illustrate the Tuestion about the necessity for proof of knowledge. I really shake here by referring to that, and I don't mean to be querulous, but the Court said, in substance if not directly "If you believe that Ja B. Lam did not know what he was doing, then the government has not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt."

I think the Court should have stated, most respectfully, that, if you believe that Lan Han Chung -- if you believe the government has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that Lan Han Chung knew what was in the bag was heroin, in other words, I think you kind of gave us a little of the burden, and I am sure it tase't --

THE COURT: Do you want me to say it mysin the right way?

MR. FISHER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FISHER: And finally, if your Honor please, this is a problem, I think, when you started to discuss aiding and abetting you introduced the subject by stating, and now there is an alternate way you can find guilt with the standard that I will now define to you, and you never ever, so far as -- and if I am wrong, please correct me --

THE COURT: If I never, then I never ever.

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IR. FISHER: I don't believe the Court ever stated during the discussion of the miding and abetting that they must find aiding and abetting beyond a remachable doubt.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FISHER: That's all I have.

(In open court)

THE COURT: A few points which counsel relieve would clarify things, and I am nappy to make this statement if it clarifies things.

dumber one, and this is not just a matter of clarification, this is a matter of solutance, i mad to you all of the overt acts when I read you the overt acts.

In view of the fact that Count 1 in which the overt acts appear no longer applies to Mr. Lam I am instructing you that you are to disregard all references to him in that count, including overt act number 4 and 5.

Second, in case there was any doubt about it, it is Mr. Chea's contention, and as I told you before I don't sponsor anybody's contentions, that the defense of entrapment is available to him as to all of the charges here, and you must consider his case in that light. That is, you must consider he alleges that he has been entrapped

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with regard to all of the offenses charged against his.

the government's proving that a defendant knew what he was doing, and I may or may not have misstated in my example, but in order to make it certain that I stated correctly, I wish to advise you regarding hr. Lam that if you believe that the government has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that hr. Lam knew what the contents of the bag were at the time that he was arrested, then he cannot be found guilty with regard to the substantive charges against him.

Finally, in case I didn't tall you, I want you to understand that although a person may be found guilty, if you find that they are an aider and abettor, under the terms previously described, it is, of course, necessary for the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they are an aider and abettor, the standard is the same as to that as it is to anything else.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, that is it and I am about to have the marshals swern so you can begin your deliberations.

It becomes my unhappy responsibility, however, now to excuse Mrs. McCarthy and Mr. Provenza. They have served loyally and faithfully, as you all have in this

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excused from the responsibilities of deliberation, but in any event the law prevents me from allowing the alternates to stay on once we have the 12 regular jurors safely in harbor after the case has been tried and they have been instructed.

So, you are excused at this time with the great thanks of the Court, and I am sure of the lawyers, defendants, government and will you please go to Room 109 to complete the formalities for your service, and I guess to be sure that you will be paid sooner or later.

Thank you very much.

(Two alternate jurors excused)

THE COURT: I want to give out now to Mr.

Weiner the original of each of these verdict lists, of
which there are three. I will ask the marshals to stand
so they can be sworn.

(Two marshals sworn by the clerk)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, one last word. There are two ways we can arrange for your lunch. One is for you to go out, and the other is to bring the lunch in. I am going to be rather arbitrary, if you don't mind, and arrange for the lunch to be brought in because it takes a fair amount of time to serve a group

the day.

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I think it will save time for you, and I hope that is what you want.

as large as yours and I think it would really cut into

over every mouthful or anything else. You decide your-

selves i w you want to handle that. But, in any event,

I am not suggesting that you should deliverate

For that reason, I will, or, in that connection, I will ask the marshal as soon as you can to pass around a menu which has some choices on it and for you to indicate what sandwiches or other food you would like to have brought in and we will try to make it as comfortable as possible.

One other things. I was told yesterday the jury room was terribly not and stuffy. I don't know what we can do about cooling it off, and if it becomes oppressive, if you want, with the approval of the lawyers, which I am sure I have, I would be glad to put some more chairs in the robing room and let you sit in there. It is a little smaller, but it has a window which can be opened if it gets too stuffy.

Do you want to start out in the jury room?
Why don't you do that, but if it becomes bad, then knock
on the door and tell the marshal, and I am now advising

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everybody in the presence of everybody that I authorize a transfer of the jury from the jury room to the robing room if they asked to be transferred.

All right, ladies and gentlemen, will you please go with the marshals and commence your deliberations.

I believe I have a copy of the indictment and I am nanding over a copy of the indictment to Mr. Weiner at this time.

(Jury leaves to commence deliberation)

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, before you give that,
might I address the Court at the side bar?

THE COURT: All right. I will send it in.

Mr. Fisher.

MR. FISHER: Just with respect to the indictment to be consistent --

THE COURT: Do you want to strike the references?

MR. FISHER: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Pykett, do you have any objections to striking the references to the --

MR. PYKETT: Your Honor, I am not that familiar with that. May I see what you are referring to?

THE COURT: Yes. The conspiracy charges Mr.

Lam and names him as a conspirator and makes reference

to him in these two overt acts which I have already

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instructed the jury to disregard. Mr. Fisher is suggesting that that material should be visually stricken when the indictment goes into the jury.

MR. PYKETT: I have no objection to that, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. There is no objection, and I will leave it to you, Mr. Fisher and Mr. Pykett, to make the necessary change.

MR. FISHER: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Your Honor, may the defendants remain in the courtroom for a while, if it is no great inconvenience to the marshals?

THE COURT: Yes, it is all right with me.

Gentlemen, I will be in chambers at least until 12:30. I may leave at that time. I will leave at the normal lunchtime, a quarter of one, until 2:00. I will be available otherwise.

Now, I ask your assistance to the maximum possible in avoiding the necessity for calling me. With regard to exhibits for example, I expect you will be able to agree as to what they are. With regard to testimony, there may be questions. I recognized yesterday when I spoke to Mr. Bannigan about what the jury is asking for, or how much ought to go in, and if I have to be here I

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will, but I hope that that can be avoided.

MR. RASSNER: Your Honor, one thing, I have a pre-trial conference before Judge Gagliardi. I wonder if I may be excused to go up there and they can call me in the other courtroom if something happens.

THE COURT: What time is it?

MR. RASSNER: It was supposed to be on this morning. I had better get up there and see if it is still on. It will be in Room 619.

THE COURT: All right.

(Recess)

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(In the robing room)

THE COURT: For the record, I have received three notes which will be marked Court's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.

(Court's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 received in evidence)

THE COURT: Exhibit No. 1 asks for transcript of the arresting officer's testimony when he picked up the Lais. I take it, Mr. Rosenthal --

MR. ROSENTHAL: I found that, both the direct and cross on that.

THE COURT: Second, the pictures taken on July 11, 1973.

MR. ROSENTHAL: There were no pictures on July There were pictures taken of Mr. Chea's residence 11. on the 12th.

THE COURT: Well, I will ask the foreman to tell us what pictures he is talking about.

Third, papers that the Lais filled out at the Drug Enforcement Office.

MR. ROSENTHAL: That would be the consents and the map, the formal consent and the informal consents, I would take it.

THE COURT: Well, anyway two documents, one on

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yellow paper and one --

MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Number 3, the Judge's charge on entrapment. I want to comment on that. I will do it now.

Mr. Rassner is the one concerned, I do not expect to read back the whole charge on entrapment. In the first place it would take time, in the second place my experience is that if you haven't understood it the first time it is better to try to approach it some other way the second time.

I therefore intend merely to state that the law with regard to entrapment is as follows: In the first place, the issue does not arise unless the jury finds that there is some credible evidence that a government agent or employee induced Mr. Chea to commit this crime. If they find that, then they must find in order to convict that the government has established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Chea was ready and willing to perform this, inspite of the inducement.

MR. RASSNER: I will consent to that. I would ask your Honor just to add those two words, without persuasion, at the end in accordance with the Sorells, the Sherman, U.S. versus Reilley.

THE COURT: Without persuasion or inducement,

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you mean.

MR. RASSNER: Yes, just at the very end of your sentence, otherwise, your Honor, I have no exception, I agree with it completely.

MR. PYKETT: Your Honor, in every case there is some inducement on the part of the government agent here. It is really the planting of the scene in the mind of the defendant, that is, I think when we refer to entrapment we are talking about --

THE COURT: I don't think in every case there is some inducement by a government officer. I mean, it may be a fairly common fact in such cases, and then its always up to the judge in the first instance to determine whether there is enough to go to the jury, but I think the very fact I have allowed that issue to go to the jury is sufficient for me to put it the way I have. I really don't believe put in that simple and fundamental language it is so hard for laymen to understand what the concept is.

I will consider the question of the phrase, planting the seed, but at the moment I am inclined to leave it the way I -- ;

MR. RASSNER: I would make one comment on that. I think planting a seed places a, really not a -- a proper

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interpretation of the defense of entrapment. Suppose the man somewhere along the line has changed his mind, decided not to commit the crime, and at that point he is induced by a government agent to commit --

THE COURT: I suppose philosophically you would say the seed was planted at that point, but I don't want to get bogged down in that discussion. The reason I like to use the words, inducement or persuasion, is I think they have certain understood meanings, at least among lawyers and judges, and I think laymen understand what they mean too.

To go on with Exhibit No. 2, the second item asks for the tape and transcript of the conversation between Agent Quarequio and Chea in the car. That is, "Do you believe that he never did it before?" Have you been able to locate that?

MR. FISHER: Yes. I just wanted to clear that. When they say between Quarequio and Chea, I am sure they mean between Quarequio and Tripp, because they quote the line, so I don't think there is any argument about that. We have found that.

THE COURT: Third, Mr. Lai's business cards.

There is no problem about that.

MR. ROSENTHAL: No.

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THE COURT: Message number 3 asks for the tape and transcript, referring to Lan Man Chung.

MR. FISHER: I believe they are, number one, there are two conversations, only one of which was on tape.

That's the one -- that's one of the tapes I played in summation, 3529.

THE COURT: Let's go on where there is a question of what the word "No" means.

MR. FISHER: Right. Now we have the tape, we have only one machine, we haven't found the tape yet, and we have the transcript. So we are pretty ready on that.

THE COURT: Next, Lan Man Chung's address book. They mean that one page, Exhibit 12.

MR. FISHER: Yes.

THE COURT: And finally, Agent Quarequio's testimony in the Italian restaurant about Lan Man Chung's partnership with Mr. Chea.

MR. FISHER: I think we agree on that.

Now, with regard to that, before we -- well, with regard to cross-examination I would offer -- frankly I think my whole cross was directly to that one thing, but admittedly circuitously I am not -- I am asking for a few pages, 204 through half of 206, which talks about, you had this partner, you had that partner, and you had

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Ja B. Lam. The idea of the puffing.

THE COURT: If it is only two or three pages --

MR. RASSNER: I would object to that part of
I think it should stop at a certain point, and Mr.

Fisher seems to think it should continue. So we may need -

THE COURT: Can you show me what the parts of this agreement are?

MR. ROSENTHAL: I have it here.

\*MR. RASSNER: I think it can stop at the end of line 6.

THE COURT: On what page?

MR. RASSNER: 205. Let's take a look at 204 first just to get the proper sequence.

THE COURT: You propose to begin where?

(Mr. Bannigan entered the robing room)

THE COURT: Why don't you, Mr. Bannigan, look at these slips while I am ruling on a dispute between defense counsel.

MR. FISHER: Line 5 (indicating).

MR. BANNIGAN: Well, that is in evidence.

THE COURT: What do you want to go to?

MR. FISHER: Through line 14 on page 206.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, can I have your attention for a minute? With regard to this dispute between Hr.

Fisher and Mr. Rassner as to how much of the cross-examination of Quarequio should be read relating to the statement by Chea that Lam wanted to be his partner, I will rule in Mr. Rassner's favor. It seems to me that the remaining testimony which Mr. Fisher wishes to read is very peripheral to the question asked, even if it is related to it, and that it might be damaging, gratuitiously damaging to Mr. Chea.

MR. FISHER: Then I would ask your Honor that page 206 be read. I don't think there is any objection to 206, lines 1 through 14.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection?

MR. RASSNER: I haven't looked at it yet.

have no objection to that.

THE COURT: All right. Do you want to specify and let me mark the portions? You want me to stop on page 205 at line 6; is that correct?

MR. RASSNER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And pick up again at the top of page 206 and run to line 14?

MR. FISHER: Line 1 through line 14.

MR. RASSNER: There is no objection to that, your Honor.

MR. FISHER: Now, your Honor, there is one more

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thing on the last note of considerable importance, I think. They also asked for the card found on the defendant Lam of Leico Business Company.

THE COURT: Wait a minute.

MR. FISHER: The business card.

THE COURT: Number 2 is business card in -possession, misspelled -- of Lan Man Chung.

MR. FISHER: I am sure they are referring to Leico business card. The problem is there was no Leico business card found on Lam, and I ask your Honor to very strongly make that clear to them.

THE COURT: I will.

MR. BANNIGAN: It was not on him.

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. BANNIGAN: Have you ruled on any of these other ones?

THE COURT: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record)

THE COURT: With regard to Item No. 1 of Exhibit
No. 1, which is Quarequio's testimony about arresting
the Lais --

MR. ROSENTHAL: Not Quarequio.

MR. BANNIGAN: Maher's.

THE COURT: Maher's rather, Mr. Rosenthal says

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he assumes that the cross-examination will be read as well as the direct. Is it very long?

MR. BANNIGAN: Quite long. I think an easy way to do it is just say, we will read until you come to the point where you want us to stop.

THE COURT: They are not contiguous.

MR. ROSENTHAL: They are not.

THE COURT: The direct and cross aren't contiguous. So what I will do is this, Mr. Rosenthal, I will ask them, before I start reading it, whether they want the direct testimony or the cross-examination, or both. I will leave it entirely up to them.

Now, gentlemen, with regard to the reading of testimony, now that it has been settled, I would ask your indulgence not to sit there and listen to it. Do you need me to listen to it?

MR ROSENTHAL: No. And with the understanding that the reporter would not read colloquy and objections and the like, just read the actual testimony.

THE COURT: Correct.

(In open court - jury present)

THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. Ladies and gentlemen, I have received three notes from you with a variety of items. I am going to read them into the

 entirely clear to counsel and myself and we would have to have some clarification from you, Mr. Weiner, but on the whole they are very understandable and I thank you for being as careful as you have been.

Number one, Court Exhibit 1, transcript of the

arresting officer's testimony when he picked up the Lais.

record and comment on each one. Some of them are not

The first question I have to ask, and I think

I am going to ask my law clerk to make a list of the

things that I may ask you to return to the jury room and

talk about and then come back and answer, I think we agreed

to know whether you want to hear direct testimony of

Agent Maher, who was the officer in question, or the cross
examination of Agent Maher or both.

Do you understand that? Perhaps you would like to make a note of the questions that I am putting to you also.

In other words, direct or cross or both on the arresting officer's testimony.

The second question has to do with the second item, you talk about pictures taken on July 11, 1973.

Everybody is in agreement that there were no pictures actually taken on that date, so if you will tell us after you return from the jury room what the subject

matter of the pictures is, we will be able to identify them.

Item No. 3 are the papers that the Lais filled out at the Drug Enforcement Office. They consist of what we have referred to as the map and the consent to search, and I think Ar. Bannigan, both can be delivered to Ar. Weiner at this time.

MR. BANNIGAN: They are Government's Exhibits 23 and 23-A (handing).

THE COURT: All right.

The next is my charge on entrapment.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am not going to repeat my entire charge on that subject for two reasons: In the first place, it is fairly long, and in the second place, if I wasn't quite successful in making you understand the law on that subject as I did give it to you before, perhaps a new approach to the subject would be better and more successful. So I am going to give you a simplified instruction, but I think it contains all of the material really that I told you about earlier. That is as follows:

The question of entrapment is not even raised unless the jury finds that there is credible evidence that a government agent or employee induced or persuaded

Mr. Chea to commit the transactions that he is alleged to have committed. That is number one.

If you do find that there is such credible evidence, then you cannot convict Mr. Chea unless you find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that inspite of the inducement and persuasion, Mr. Chea was in any case ready, willing and able to commit those transactions.

Does the jury understand that instruction?

Is there anybody who would like any clarification on that?

All right. I think just for those two simple propositions perhaps you won't have any difficulty.

Next is Item 2 on Exhibit 2, that is tape and transcript of conversation between, as you put it, Agent Q and Chea in the car.

I believe Mr. Weiner that you mean between Agent Q and Mr. Tripp in the car, or Agent Tripp, because you have in paren, "Do you believe that he never did it before?" and that conversation was between the two of them.

THE FOREMAN: What we wanted was the whole tape to hear what came before, plus --

THE COURT: Then that is the tape you are referring to? Everybody agrees that that is the tape?

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All right, the jury indicates that it is. And the whole tape will be played.

Next item is No. 3 on Court Exhibit 2, Mr. Lai's business cards. Do you have those, Mr. Bannigan?

MR. BANNIGAN: I have one, yes.

THE COURT: You don't want more than one, do you ladies and gentlemen?

MR. ROSENTHAL: There was a box.

MR. BANNIGAN: Do you want the whole box?

MR. ROSENTHAL: The box was marked into evidence and one individual card was taken from that box.

THE COURT: I understand that, Mr. Rosentnal, but I think the jury indicated that they are not concerned about the whole box. Am I right?

All right. That exhibit has now been delivered.

THE FOREMAN: Your Honor, on this we would like

to know where this card came from? Did it come from the box or were there cards taken off --

THE COURT: The exhibit in your hand? Will you give me the number of it?

THE FOREMAN: 27-A.

MR. ROSENTHAL: It came from the box, 27, the box of cards, and that in turn came from Mr. Lai's home.

THE COURT: That is what Mr. Rosenthal thinks,

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off people.

Mr. Bannigan is shaking his head.

THE FOREMAN:

THE COURT: One thing at a time. The particular card that you are holding in your hand --

he wants to know is whether any of these cards were taken

MR. BANNIGAN: As I understood the question

That's correct.

MR. BANNIGAN: That one came out of the box, that one did, yes (indicating).

THE COURT: All right.

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And you have --

MR. ROSENTHAL: I think the record should show that that box was in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Lai.

THE COURT: All right. Perhaps so. I think maybe your unresolved question will be answered when I comment on the next item.

The next item is, business card in possession of Lam Man Chung. My impression is that you are referring there to a business card perhaps of Mr. Lai; am I correct in that impression?

THE FOREMAN: Yes, I believe so.

THE COURT: But there is no such business card in the possession of Lam Man Chung. There was, however, a business card of Mr. Lai in the possession, found in the possession of Mr. Chea. Is that what the jury wants? On my explanation?

THE FOREMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: That seems to be it.

MR. BANNIGAN: I tender Government's Exhibit 15 (handing).

THE COURT: The next item, number 3, Exhibit 3, is Lam Man Chung's address book, and that, of course, you mean, I think, onepage because it's only the page that is in evidence; is that correct, Mr. Weiner?

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THE FOREMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: As to the address book. All right. Would you deliver that page?

MR. BANNIGAN: Government's Exhibit 12 (handing).

THE COURT: And finally you have asked for Agent

Quarequio's testimony in the Italian restaurant about Lam

Man Chung's partnership with Mr. Chea, the parties have

located that testimony and will be prepared, or, the court

reporter will be prepared to read that to you.

Am I incorrect about that?

MR. FISHER: Well, I think you skipped something on the sheet, your Honor. I don't think you covered Court Exhibit 2.

THE COURT: Which item do you think I didn't cover?

MR. FISHER: I believe there was a request for the "no."

THE COURT: You are absolutely right. I will come back to that in a moment.

MR. FISHER: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: That's all right. After the questions have been answered that I asked you to jot down, the reporter will be prepared to read the testimony that you have asked for, and the attorneys or the reporter will be prepared to

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play the tapes that you want to hear.

Now, there was one further thing which Mr. Fisher reminds me of, that is Item No. 1 of Court Exhibit 3 which you have stated as tape and transcript, referring to Lam Man Chung, and we believe that that is the tape in which Mr. Fisher and Mr. Bannigan disagree as to what the proper meaning is; are we correct about that?

> THE FOREMAN: That's right.

THE COURT: All right, and that will be played for you, too.

MR. BANNIGAN: Your Honor, there was a request, I believe for the transcript and tape of the June 25th conversation in which we have two agents speaking, and I believe Mr. Foreman said they wanted the entire thing. Now, do they want the entire tape played or do they want the entire transcript, the accuracy of which has been stipulated by all counsel?

THE FOREMAN: We want both, because the tape is very difficult to hear.

MR. BANNIGAN: Well, the whole tape has never been played.

MR. FISHER: If your Honor please, I would object to any comment by Mr. Bannigan at this time.

THE COURT: Well, I think that we should replay

only what was played during the course of the trial. Mr. Fisher?

MR. FISHER: If your Honor please, I specifically offered the whole thing for that purpose.

THE COURT: Well, I don't recall frankly whether the whole thing --

MR. FISHER: My recollection is --

THE COURT: Let me suggest that the ladies and gentlemen of the jury return to the jury room to answer the two questions that I asked, just let the marshal know as soon as you have answered those questions and come back in here, and in the meantime we will try to deal with this tape transcript question.

Mr. Fisher, why would you feel it to your advantage to have the whole tape played?

MR. FISHER: I think, your Honor, what the jury is grappling with now is whether the explanation by Mr. Quarequio with that last statement was a truthful one and I think they want to hear if anywhere on that tape there is anything about, "This is the first time I ever gave anybody a sample."

I think they may also have come to the conclusion that these transcripts aren't as good as the tape. And since I feel that's a pretty strong point in our defense, and since

they specifically asked for the whole tape I think their request should be honored, your Honor.

THE COURT: How long would the whole tape take?

NR. FISHER: I would imagine about a half hour.

THE COURT: Let me tell them that it would take a whole half hour and see whether they want to hear it for a whole half hour or not.

I am not going to go beyond that, but I will do that.

MR. BANNIGAN: I have no objection either way.

I just thought it would be easier. I don't care whether it is played or not.

THE COURT: I agree. They are entitled to anything they want, but if it were to take six days and they didn't know it, I would at least want them to know about it in advance.

MR. FISHER: In the meanwhile -- well, let's not do anything.

I hope your Honor will note that it will take us about five minutes to locate the other tape they want which is about a minute, but bear that in mind.

THE COURT: Well, you can handle that any way you want. I think the reporter might as well read them what he can read them and you can play what is ready to play,

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then even in my absence it seems to me you can let them go back to the jury room and let the marshal know when you are ready to let them hear the rest of it.

MR. FISHER: That's fine, your Honor.

MR. PYKETT: Your Honor, may I be excused?

THE CCURT: Yes, you may, Mr. Pykett. Thank you for helping out.

I have received another message. This is one way of solving the problem. It will be marked Exhibit 4.

(Court Exhibit No. 4 received in evidence.)

THE COURT: It says, Maher's testimony, both direct and cross, and it says, all pictures taken.

Will you bring the jury in, please.

(Jury enters the courtroom.)

THE COURT: I have got your note saying that you would like to hear both direct and cross-examination of Agent Maher and that you would like to see all the pictures.

Have you got all the pictures?

MR. BANNIGAN: We have.

THE COURT: And will you respectively state what they are?

MR. BANNIGAN: 17D, 17A, 17B, 17C.

THE COURT: It might be well just for the jury's benefit, unless there is any dispute about it, to state for

the record what the pictures are.

MR. BANNIGAN: Those are the surveillance photos.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FISHER: I have defendant Chea's exhibits B and Bl through 5 inclusive which are the pictures of Mr. Chea's apartment taken at the time of the search.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Now, I'm sorry to send you back and forth so many times, ladies and gentlemen, but there is one further matter I would like you to discuss among yourselves and then answer to me.

In regard to the transcript and tape that we last talked about, referring to Mr. Lam Man Chung, we do have the entire tape. I want you to know that it will take about a half hour to play it. Since you have never heard it in full you didn't know that and I think you ought to discuss among yourselves whether you would like to hear the whole tape.

The whole transcript is available in any case, and whatever part of the tape you would like to hear will be played.

Will you return to the jury room and make a decision? Am I wrong?

MR. BANNIGAN: I believe so, your Honor. I

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believe two tapes we're talking about here, the tape the jurors have not heard is the tape in which at the end of which the two agents are speaking. That has nothing to do with --

THE COURT: Excuse me. I have got my tapes mixed up. In any event then the tape at the end of which what you did ask to hear Agent Quarequio is talking to Agent Trip and talking about whether they would believe that Mr. Chea did or didn't do something before. You have heard the end of that, you have not heard the whole tape. The whole tape will take about 30 minutes to play; is that correct?

MR. BANNIGAN: About that.

THE COURT: And you should consider whether you want to hear the whole tape or only that portion that you have heard in the past.

Would you return to the jury room and reach a consensus on that, then let me know?

And when you have an answer, just tell the marshal to come back here, because you have to come back here any way to hear the reading of the testimony.

(Jury leaves the courtroom.)

(Jury enters the courtroom.)

THE COURT: I called you in, maybe Mr. Weiner

has the answer to my question on his paper there, but because I wanted to be sure there was no misunderstanding. I believe when I sent you back the last time I asked you to decide whether you wanted to hear all that tape involving Agent Quarequio and Agent Trip or just part of it, and since it has taken you as long as it has, I wondered whether you understood that that is what I wanted to know from you.

THE FOREMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Have you reached a decision on that?

THE FOREMAN: Yes, we would like the complete transcript of the tape and we would like to hear the last section of it.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fisher?

THE FOREMAN: Your Honor, on the other tape, the one where Mr. Chea mentions Ja B. Lam --

THE COURT: Not Mr. Chea, he doesn't mention

Ja B. Lam -- well, I won't characterize it. All right, go

ahead.

THE FOREMAN: Where his name comes up. We would like just that section and the transcript on that section.

THE COURT: Very good. Now, ladies and gentlemen since I have other duties, and since I believe I have settled all questions that there were as to what you wanted and any disputes that there may have been which were very

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minor between the government and defense counsel as to how they should be handled. I am going to return to my chambers to do other work. I will be available if needed. It does seem to me, ladies and gentlemen, that since you are right in the through of this we should stay at it, and I would intend to arrange for dinner at about 6:30 if that is necessary, I am telling you now so that you can make your plans accordingly.

If there are any of you that need to have telephone messages sent because of that, you can, through the marshal, give the number of the telephone, the name of the person and the message, and Mrs. Panzer, the court clerk, will make the call for you. We cannot allow you to call yourselves.

Thank you.

(Record read by the court reporter.)

MR. FISHER: We are going to give you the transcript now of the other tape and we will set it up.

(Tape recording played to jury.)

MR. BANNIGAN: I would like to stop here. Let's get the judge. I would like the judge down here.

(In open court; jury not present.)

MR. FISHER: In the absence of the Judge, but in the presence of Mr. Bannigan I would like the record to

reflect that at the jurors' request the tape portion relating to Exhibit 3529 was played three times.

(In open court; jury present.)

THE COURT: Mr. Weiner, I asked you to bring in the verdict slips for two reasons. In the first place I wondered whether by chance you have reached a verdict on any of the counts by this time, and if you had it would be appropriate for me to ask what the verdict is.

Have you?

THE FOREMAN: No, I have to say no to that.

think it would be a good idea for us to go to dinner at this time. I assume arrangements have been made. I think it would be better that we keep the verdict slips with the clerk until you return from dinner, and of course we will return them to you.

All right, ladies and gentlemen, as soon as you get back, you can start to work, but I hope you have a chance to relax at dinner.

MR. BANNIGAN: What time, your Honor? Any particular time?

THE COURT: Well, would you please do your best to be back here by quarter of eight?

(Dinner recess.)

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1 mmd 2 . (In open court; jury present.) 3 THE COURT: Be seated, please. 4 THE CLERK: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, .5 please answer to your presence. 6 Mr. Weiner? 7 MR. WEINER: Here. 8 THE CLERK: Mr. Lubin? 9 MR. LUBIN: Here. 10 THE CLERK: Mr. Cousins? 11 MR. COUSINS: Here. 12 THE CLERK: Miss Heinman? 13 MISS HEINMAN: Here. 14 THE CLERK: Miss Poster? 15 MISS POSTER: Here. 16 THE CLERK: Mr. Lunney? 17 MR. LUNNEY: Here. 18 THE CLERK: Miss Pincour? 19 MISS PINCOUR: Here. 20 THE CLERK: Mr. Berretto? 21 MR. BERRETTO: Here. 22 THE CLERK: Mr. Bynoff? 23 MR. BYNOFF: Here.

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Here.

THE CLERK: Miss Bradley?

MISS BRADLEY:

on Count 6?

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THE FOREMAN: Guilty.

THE CLERK: How do you find as to defendant Lai

THE FOREMAN: Guilty.

THE CLERK: How do you find as to defendant Chea

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2	on Count 1?
3	THE FOREMAN: Guilty.
4	THE CLERK: How do you find as to defendant Chea
5	on Count 2?
6	THE FOREMAN: Guilty.
7	THE CLERK: How do you find as to defendant Chea
8	on Count 4?
9	THE FOREMAN: Guilty.
10	THE CLERK: How do you find as to defendant Chung
11	on Count 5?
12	THE FOREMAN: Guilty.
13	THE CLERK: So say you all?
14	THE COURT: Gentlemen, do you wish to have the
15	jury polled?
16	MR. FISHER: Yes, your Honor.
17	THE CLERK: Mr. Weiner, is that your verdict?
18	MR. WEINER: Yes, it is.
19	THE CLERK: Mr. Lubin, is that your verdict?
20	MR. LUBIN: It is.
21	THE CLERK: Mr. Cousins, is that your verdict?
22	MR. COUSINS: It is.
23	THE CLERK: Miss Heinman, is that your verdict?
24 25	MISS HEINMAN: Yes, it is.
ت	THE CLERK: Miss Poster, is that your verdict?

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MISS POSTER: Yes.

THE CLERK: Mr. Lunney, is that your verdict?

MR. LUNNEY: Yes.

THE CLERK: Miss Pincour, is that your verdict?

MISS PINCOUR: Yes, it is.

THE CLERK: Mr. Berretto, is that your verdict?

MR. BERRETTO: Yes.

THE CLERK: Mr. Bynoff, is that your verdict?

MR. BYNOFF: It is.

THE CLERK: Miss Bradley, is that your verdict?

MISS BRADLEY: Yes.

THE CLERK: Miss Lindrose, is that your verdict?

MISS LINDROSE: Yes.

THE CLERK: Mr. Berkowitz, is that your verdict?

MR. BERKOWITZ: Yes.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I want to thank you for the industry and patience which you have put into this case. By thanking you I am not commenting on the verdict, I don't think it is the judge's province to comment on the verdict, but I do always recognize that for a jury to determine the guilt of any defendant is a very demanding proposition, as it should be, and in this case, however, I want to make a special remark.

The case had its particular difficulty in being

week, having you away for two and a half weeks and bringing you back. You have really been the most responsible jury in terms of attendance, attention, promptness and general reliability of any juror that I have had in my service on the bench, and I thank you very much.

spread over a long period of time, having you here for a

You are discharged at this time.

Are there any particular instructions for the jury?

THE CLERK: No, your Honor, they are released now and I have their certificates for them.

THE COURT: All right. You should be receiving your compensation in the near future, and thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

Is there any assistance we can give any of the jurors to get home at this hour?

A MARSHAL: You can authorize transportation for them, your Honor.

THE COURT: How long would it take to get it?

A MARSHAL: It will take about a half hour.

THE COURT: If any of you want to wait a half hour I will be glad to authorize it. If you prefer to leave then you can take the subway here, there are problems such as there are in any part of the city, but that is up to you.

How many of you would like to have transportation home?

Well, those of you who wish to, will you see the marshal in there and he can make the necessary arrangements, and you can just wait in the jury room until the transportation is available.

Thank you very much.

(Jury discharged.)

THE COURT: All right, gentlemen, I am setting the sentence date for Friday, December 21, 1973 at 9:45 a.m. in Room 501 of the courthouse.

Does that present a problem to you, Mr. Bannigan?

MR. BANNIGAN: No, I have an application, your

Honor. That is that all defendants be remanded, that all
bail be revoked. There is presently bail.

THE COURT: They are in custody though?

MR. BANNIGAN: Yes, but there is bail. I am asking there be no bail in light of the large amount of narcotics in this case, the size of the case. There is a possibility that one might jump bail. At this juncture I think it would be very dangerous.

THE COURT: I will hear defense counsel, but I am predisposed to grant his application which can always be reviewed, of course.

MR. ROSENTHAL: I think it is academic, your

Honor. Nobody has been able to furnish bail.

THE COURT: Since it is academic, I will grant it. That merely means it puts the burden on you to apply for bail if you are in a position to do so, rather than for him to apply in case you are able to do so.

Is there anything further at this time?

MR. FISHER: If your Honor please, on behalf of defendant Lam I move to reserve all motions until the date of sentence.

THE COURT: That motion is granted to all defense counsel, except I make this observation that I always do at this particular time in the course of a trial, and that is that if you mean to press your motions with true seriousness then I want to have the papers no less than two weeks before the date of sentence so that the United States Attorney can apply within a week thereafter and I can give them serious attention.

All right, gentlemen. Thank you very much. I think you have all done a very responsible job in the trial of this case.

(Court recessed; time noted: 9:25 p.m.)

STATE OF NEW YORK : SS'. COUNTY OF RICHMOND )

ROBERT BAILEY, being duly sworn, deposes and says, that deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age and resides at 286 Richmond Avenue, Staten Island, , 1974 deponent served the day of NARCH N.Y. 10302. That on the upon U.S. Atly. Souther District of within Appendix

attorney(s) for Appellee

1.5. Courthuse
in this action, at Foley Sq.

N-Y-C.

the address designated by said attorney(s) for that purpose by depositing 3 true copies of same enclosed in a postpaid properly addressed wrapper, in an official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States post office department within the State of New York.

Sworn to before me, this

**WILLIAM BAILEY** 

Notary Public, State of New York

No. 43-0132945

Qualified in Richmond County

Commission Expires March 30,